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ABSTRACT
Over 2.5 million Americans served in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In this short article, we
consider the impact of these experiences on their future welfare. Specifically, we ask if those who
served in Afghanistan and Iraq are more or less likely to exploit their GI Bill benefits in order to
pursue higher education than service members who did not directly participate in these conflicts.
We exploit a comprehensive administrative dataset that the US Armed Forces’ Defense
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) provided to us. We find across models that deployment to
Afghanistan or Iraq significantly increases the likelihood that veterans will take advantage of
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I. Introduction
Over 2.5 million Americans served in the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq (OEF/OIF).1 Given the size of
this cohort, it is of the utmost importance that both
veterans and the public develop a good understanding
of the socio-economic consequences of veterans’
recent experiences. In this short article, we ask
whether those who served in OEF/OIF are more or
less likely to take advantage of the Montgomery
GI Bill (MGIB). The MGIB provides up to 36 months
of benefits worth as much as $70 000 towards educa-
tion expenses for veterans who commence studies
within 10 years of discharge from military service.
Selection biases and limited data make it difficult
to study how combat deployment affects veterans.
All those who served in OEF/OIF, for example, were
volunteers. Hence, fundamental differences in char-
acter and personality between those who seek out
military service and those who avoid it bias any
naïve comparison of life outcomes. Furthermore,
much of the data gathered on veterans is inherently
unreliable self-reported information gathered from
those who bother to respond to surveys.
To overcome these problems, the seminal Angrist
(1990) analysis of the impact of the Vietnam era
draft on the earnings of veterans exploited the draft
lottery and aggregate Social Security data. Angrist’s
approach, however, could not differentiate between
draftees who spent two years in an office at Fort Sill,
two years in an office in Saigon or a year fighting in
the Mekong Delta. Hence, his findings shed little light
on how actual deployment and combat, as opposed to
military service in general, affects veterans.
One feature of OEF/OIF, however, has made it
possible to overcome selection bias in identifying the
impact of deployment on veterans. Simply put, no
one who participated in the earliest phases of these
conflicts actually volunteered to serve in Afghanistan
or Iraq. Rather, they volunteered for specific special-
ties in the US Armed Forces during peacetime, and
then were assigned to various units based on military
requirements. Some of those units, in turn, were
assigned to OEF/OIF while other units were not.
A number of recent papers – Lyle (2006), Engel,
Gallagher, and Lyle (2010), and Cesur, Sabia, and
Tekin (2013) – have exploited this feature of OEF/OIF
in order to evaluate the impact of combat deployment
on veterans’ mental health and the school performance
of their children. These papers, however, still rely on
surveys. Furthermore, they compare outcomes for all
soldiers deployed in OEF/OIF with outcomes for all
those who were not. Since deployed soldiers dispropor-
tionately specialized in combat and combat support
professions, there is still potential for bias.
In this article, we overcome many of the statistical
challenges faced by these earlier studies by exploiting
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a comprehensive database compiled from adminis-
trative records. In Section II, we describe our data.
In Section III, we describe our econometric strategy.
In Section IV, we report our results. Section V con-
cludes this article.
II. Data
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) has pro-
vided us with data that covers all enlisted members
of the US Armed Forces who volunteered for service
prior to September 2001 but had yet to complete
their first term of service by that date – a total of
384 005 individuals. By focusing on this cohort, we
eliminate any possibility that attitudes towards 9/11
or the prospect of imminent combat deployment
could have influenced volunteers’ decisions to join
the armed forces or their preferences for a particular
Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) or unit. Also,
our sample made the decision to leave, and for the
most part to use, the MIGB program before they had
the additional option of the post-9-11 GI Bill that
went into effect in 2008.
DMDC has provided data on each individual’s race
and gender, as well as percentile scores on the Armed
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). The data also
includes annual updates of marital status, number of
children, educational attainment and MOS for as long
as the individual is in uniform. These variables could
influence veterans’ interest in tertiary education.
DMDC (2013) also provided information on each
individual’s OEF/OIF deployments – including their
location and dates, as well the number of deaths
sustained by the individual’s unit during each deploy-
ment, something we treat as a proxy for the intensity
of the combat experienced during the deployment.
The Veterans Administration (VA) provided the
MGIB usage data. Table 1 provides descriptive
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
All first-term enlisted First-term enlisted combat
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. Obs. Mean SD Min. Max.
AFQT percentile 3 84 005 63.3584 0 58 771 56.61127 0
24.57459 99 18.84451 99
Age end first term 3 71 210 23.7028 17 57 181 23.20246 17
3.111969 54 2.914045 54
Children end first term 3 71 213 0.44322 0 57 181 0.4110281 0
0.821683 9 0.0821968 9
Married end first term 3 71 213 0.387597 0 57 181 0.3312114 0
0.487202 1 0.470653 1
Some college end first term 3 67 958 0.033485 0 56 534 0.0250292 0
0.179899 1 0.1562151 1
College end first term 3 67 958 0.01913 0 56 534 0.0116744 0
0.136982 1 0.1074165 1
Beyond college end first term 3 67 958 0.991536 0 56 534 0.0009729 0
0.039155 1 0.0311759 1
Medical MOS 3 84 005 0.058991 0
0.0235609 1
Support MOS 3 84 005 0.101882 0
0.302493 1
Combat MOS 3 84 005 0.153048 0
0.360034 1
Black 3 50 767 0.236673 0 53 019 0.128084 0
0.42504 1 0.3341469 1
Hispanic 3 83 328 0.117349 0 58 687 0.120657 0
0.321836 1 0.3257311 1
Asian 3 83 328 0.029304 0 58 687 0.019834 0
0.168657 1 0.1394309 1
Female 3 84 004 0.16903 0
0.374779 1
Deployed 3 84 005 0.162602 0 58 771 0.1950452 0
0.369003 1 0.3962389 1
Unit deaths deployed 3 84 005 0.041333 0 58 771 0.1132531 0
0.583931 32 0.8917998 32
Duration deployed 3 84 005 1.142972 0 58 771 1.430178 0
3.14643 40 3.471497 34
Rank end first term 3 71 213 4.033681 1 58 771 3.959759 1
0.936277 9 1.004453 9
Contract end during deployment 3 84 005 0.039528 0 58 771 0.0546018 0
0.194848 1 0.2272032 1
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statistics of these variables for two samples, one cover-
ing all first term enlisted personnel and a second
covering personnel with a combat MOS.
III. Econometric strategy
Simon, Negrusa, and Warner (2010) studied the
impact of changes in the value of MGIB benefits on
its use. Following their approach, we estimate the semi-
parametric Cox-proportional hazard model to identify
the cumulative probability of MGIB usage. This model
has the advantage of not imposing a functional form
on the unobserved baseline hazard rate. Our sample
includes all personnel who were discharged at the end
of their first term. We also separate the sample into
groups with or without combat MOSs. In addition to
our variables of interest – deployment, deployment
length and our proxy for combat intensity, we add
controls for age, family status, AFQT scores, prior
education, race and MOS.
As a test for the robustness of our findings, we once
again follow Simon, Negrusa, and Warner (2010) and
consider a Heckman style selection model to control
for common factors driving the decision to leave the
military and the decision to use the MGIB subsequent
to leaving. The first stage is a probit that identifies the
group that leaves at the end of their first term of
service. This model includes two additional indepen-
dent variables. First, service member’s rank at the end
of their first term – those who have attained higher
rank are doing better in their military careers and
hence are less likely to leave. Second, whether the
service member’s first term concluded in the middle
of an OIF/OEF deployment – additional financial ben-
efits accrued to those who reenlisted while deployed,
and hence they too are less likely to leave. Once we
control for selection, we conduct a probit analysis of
the likelihood of using one’s MGIB.
IV. Results
We find that across all groups and models, deploy-
ment increases use of the MGIB, while combat
intensity lowers the use of the MGIB. In Table 2,
we report the Cox-proportional hazard results, and
in Table 3 we report similar Heckman probit results.
Examining the hazard ratios from the exponen-
tiated coefficients given in Table 2, we find that
deployment increases MGIB usage by 32%. The
results for combat personnel suggest a 48% increase.
Turning to duration, the model predicts a 2%
increase in MGIB usage for each additional month
spent deployed for the whole sample and a 1%
increase for those with a combat MOS. Offsetting
this, combat intensity decreases use of the MGIB.
We estimate a 2% decrease per death in the prob-
ability of using the MGIB for the whole sample and a
3% reduction per death for the combat MOS sample.
Turning to our selection models in Table 3, we
find very similar results. Deployments, and longer
deployment durations, significantly discourage reen-
listment. For those who do leave, we find that both
deployment and duration encourage MGIB use.
Combat intensity has a similarly negative impact
on the likelihood one will leave service, and con-
tinues to discourage use of the MGIB.
V. Discussion
On average, those deployed to OIF/OEF served for
7 months ‘in theatre’ and experienced 0.25 in-unit
Table 2. Survival analysis GI Bill use.
All first-term First-term First-term
Variables w/o reenlist combat MOS noncombat
AFQT percentile 0.00599*** 0.119*** 0.00543***
(0.000145) (0.000469) (0.000152)
Age end first term 0.0220*** 0.00882** 0.0246***
(0.00127) (0.00354) (0.00136)
Children end first term −0.116*** −0.139*** −0.114***
(0.00626) (0.0178) (0.00670)
Married end first term −0.108*** −0.115*** −0.100***
(0.00823) (0.0230) (0.00882)
Some college end first term 0.0478** −0.160*** 0.0740***
(0.0190) (0.0593) (0.0201)
College end first term −0.828*** −1.224*** −0.789***
(0.0325) (0.106) (0.0342)








Black −0.0525*** −0.0599* −0.505***
(0.00980) (0.0309) (0.00936)
Hispanic 0.212*** 0.252*** 0.208***
(0.0142) (0.0381) (0.0153)




Deployed 0.279*** 0.395*** 0.250***
(0.0147) (0.0339) (0.0162)
Duration deployed 0.0238*** 0.00997*** 0.0270***
(0.00161) (0.00372) (0.00178)
Unit deaths deployed −0.0209** −0.0297** −0.0173
(0.00836) (0.0129) (0.0112)
Observations 1 81 704 28 040 1 53 664
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
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deaths, leading to an increase in MGIB usage of 55%.
The average deployed combat specialist spent 7.3
months in theatre and experienced 0.58 in-unit
deaths, leading to an increase in MGIB usage of
57%. These very large impacts strongly suggest
that, for young people, participating in a war is a
seminal experience that influences their life long
after they return home. But is this experience on
the whole positive or negative?
At a minimum, their greater overall usage in the
MGIB suggests that OEF/OIF veterans should fare
relatively well in financial terms as they go through
life – papers such as Angrist (1993) and Angrist and
Chen (2011) have found that veterans who exploit
their educational benefits do indeed enjoy higher
lifetime incomes. But there is clearly more to it
than that.
Greater interest in higher education implies a
lower time discount rate, something that itself is
arguably associated with greater emotional maturity.
If that is the case, then wartime deployment may
actually benefit young people. It is an opportunity
for them to take on serious responsibilities early on,
and hence helps them grow up faster.
Our results, however, suggest that exposure to
actual combat and violence is detrimental and can
handicap veterans’ efforts to get on with their lives.
The survival analysis showed that unit deaths had a
large and statistically significant negative impact on
combat soldiers’ interest in higher education. For
Table 3. GI Bill use with selection.
All first-term enlisted All first-term enlisted First-term combat MOS First-term combat MOS
GI Bill used Discharged GI Bill used Discharged
AFQT percentile 0.00589*** 0.00610*** 0.0107*** 0.00605***
(0.000115) (0.000101) (0.000393) (0.000344)
Age end first term −0.0183*** −0.00533*** −0.0262*** −0.00397
(0.00112) (0.000903) (0.00300) (0.00252)
Children end first term −0.152*** −0.163*** −0.197*** −0.189***
(0.00463) (0.00339) (0.0126) (0.00929)
Married end first term −0.163*** −0.159*** −0.176*** −0.220***
(0.00660) (0.0134) (0.0180) (0.0148)
Some college end first term 0.105*** 0.159*** −0.0438 0.101**
(0.0160) (0.0134) (0.0462) (0.0405)
College end first term −0.420*** 0.377*** −0.667*** 0.535***
(0.0219) (0.0178) (0.0675) (0.0578)
Beyond college end first term −0.356*** 0.477*** −0.0179 0.338*
(0.0729) (0.0604) (0.211) (0.192)
Medical MOS 0.0954*** −0.139***
(0.0123) (0.0101)
Support MOS 0.0433*** −0.0737***
(0.00935) (0.00787)
Combat MOS 0.160*** −0.0427***
(0.00805) (0.00693)
Black −0.0744*** −0.272*** −0.0615*** −0.248***
(0.00717) (0.00587) (0.0236) (0.0194)
Hispanic 0.158*** −0.420*** 0.225*** 0.0186
(0.0120) (0.00997) (0.0326) (0.0286)
Asian 0.147*** −0.0890*** 0.231*** −0.0542
(0.0186) (0.0149) (0.0517) (0.0442)
Female 0.417*** 0.0883***
(0.00765) (0.00644)
Deployed 0.145*** 0.239*** 0.329*** 0.535***
(0.0128) (0.0119) (0.0302) (0.0310)
Duration deployed 0.0164*** 0.0319*** 0.00695** 0.0284***
(0.00144) (0.00134) (0.00334) (0.00331)
Unit deaths deployed −0.0504*** −0.0526*** −0.0655*** −0.0571***
(0.00627) (0.004211) (0.00970) (0.00715)
Rank end first term −0.694*** −0.675***
(0.00342) (0.00824)
Contract end during deployment −1.043*** −0.983***
(0.0134) (0.0292)
Constant −0.439*** 2.840*** −0.427*** 2.664***





Observations 3 35 735 3 35 735 50 964 50 964
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
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noncombat soldiers, however, the result, while still
negative, was much smaller and not statistically dif-
ferent from zero – something remarkable given the
sample size.
We can offer two hypotheses consistent with these
results. First, it is conceivable that combat units are
more tightly knit groups – hence deaths within their
ranks are felt more acutely. Second, the combat that
support personnel experience is primarily passive –
deaths occur as a result of shelling or improvised
explosive devices while they are going about their
business. Combat personnel, however, deal not only
with dying but also with killing – including killing
noncombatants and the accidental fratricide of their
comrades. It is conceivable that exposure to killing
rather than dying does the most harm to veterans
who survive and return home.
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